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The Ruhr and R evolution , by Jurgen 
Tampke, Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1978. Reviewed by John  
Perkins.
The abortive German revolution of 1918-19 
has never attracted the attention its 
significance would appear to merit. In 
Weimar Germany the official attitude was a 
virtual conspiracy of silence, in which the 
events o f the first winter after the World War 
were viewed as a momentary aberration 
from German traditions occasioned by the 
defeat. Under Hitler, the Revolution and the 
“ November Criminals” achieved more 
prominance as objects of vilification. After 
1945, in western Germany interest in the 
subject was limited until the later 1960s 
when members o f the revolutionary student 
body were drawn to the ideas of Rosa 
Luxemburg, These appeared to offer a 
more appropriate model than those of Lenin, 
as did the experiences of more romantic 
although equally tragic figures such as 
Toller and Levine ofthe Munich Soviet. Only 
in the German Democratic Republic, where 
the KPD (Communist Party of Germany) 
that emerged from the revolution provides 
the event with the area o f historical 
antecedence akin to the role o f the equally 
abortive Revolution of 1848-49 in the Federal 
R epu b lic , h as the su b je c t  rece ived  
considerable attention.
The works that have hitherto appeared 
present one or other of four interpretations of 
the Revolution. Firstly, there is what might 
be called the orthodox bourgeois or western
interpretation which favours the role o f the 
Majority SPD in averting “ Bolshevism” and 
blames the “ putschist” approach o f the 
Spartacista for the rapid recovery of the 
counter-revolutionary forces and for the 
a b s e n c e  o f  m ore  t h r o o u g h g o in  g 
dem ocratisation o f the bureaucracy, 
judiciary, and military of the subsequent 
Weimar Republic, Secondly, there is the 
National Socialist interpretation which 
places the blame for the military collapse of 
1918 on the “ November Criminals” . From 
the events o f 1918-19, the Nazis drew the 
conclusion o f the primacy of domestic policy. 
In other words, in contrast to Wilhelmian 
Germany where an aggressive foreign policy 
functioned as a means of subsuming 
domestic conflict, the aim in the Third Reich 
was to ensure a solid internal basis of unity 
for an expansionist foreign policy.
A third interpretation, first presented by 
Arthur Rosenbaerg in the early 1930s, is that 
the Revolution offered a chance o f a third 
course between the limited social and 
poli tical achievements of the Weimar 
Republic and a transformation along the 
lines of Soviet Russia. Unfortunately, 
however, this opportunity was missed by the 
Majority SPD leadership who, in allying 
themselves with the military leadership and 
the Free Corps (Freikorps), ensured the 
survival o f the Reaction. Finally, to 
historians of the GDR the Revolution also 
amounted to a lost opportunity, which 
nevertheless demonstrates the possibilities 
o f revolution in advanced industrial
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countries and the necessity for a strong, well- 
organised and competently led communist 
party to successfully exploit those 
possibilities.
In the work under review, Dr Tampke sets 
out to analyse the background and the course 
o f the revolution in the Ruhr industrial 
reg ion  in the l ight  o f  the var ious 
interpretations that have been made. In 
doing so he remedies a serious deficiency in 
the available English-language accounts in 
which the Ruhr, the most highly-developed 
region of modem industry in Europe and a 
stronghold of revolutionary forces, is 
relatively neglected. The author is concerned 
to explain how, within a few weeks o f ‘the 
collapse o f the old order’ , the left in the Ruhr 
was able to mount a serious challenge for 
power; and why unrest and revolutionary 
actons were more evident in some parts of the 
region than in others.
The basis o f the analysis is a division of the 
Ruhr into three districts which differed in 
terms o f  the form o f socio-econom ic 
development before 1918 which in turn 
determined contrasts of experience during 
the Revolution itself. In the old-established 
coalmining district o f the eastern Ruhr, the 
Bochum-Gekenkirchen-Dortmund area, the 
miners ex per ienced  a con s iderab le  
deterioration in their formerly privileged 
status with the relaxation of state control 
over the industry between 1851 and 1865. In 
response the district emerged as an early 
stronghold of the SPD and o f the socialist 
trade unions. Thereafter, the rate o f 
industrial and urban growth, while 
substantial in the context of Germany as a 
whole, was lower than in other districts o f the 
Ruhr. Consequently, a high proportion o f the 
labour force came from relatively short- 
distance migration, rather than from the 
reserve army o f displaced agricultural labour 
in Germany’s eastern territories. In addition, 
th e  p r o n o u n c e d  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  
administrative organs and service industries 
in the towns o f the eastern Ruhr provided 
substantial white-collar employment.
The eastern Ruhr by 1914 was relatively 
homogenous ethnically, had a more 
graduated  soc ia l  h i e rarch y  with a 
substantial lower middle class, and a well- 
established SPD tradition controlled by the 
party and union bureaucracies. During the 
war itself the power of the Majority SPD 
functionaries was further enhanced with the
gaining o f control of the remaining party 
newspapers and key positions from the USP 
(Independent Socialist Party) that split from 
the SPD during the War. Consequently, 
during the Revoltuion power in the eastern 
Ruhr was firmly in the hands of the 
“moderates” of the Majority SPD, The latter 
managed to effectively limit the scope and 
objectives of the labour movement and, by, 
the end of December 1918, ‘the emphasis in 
the eastern Ruhr had shifted from revolution 
to political electioneering’, which was the 
forte of the Majority SPD.
The limited objectives in the eastern Ruhr 
are illustrated by the “ Poster proclaiming 
the revolutions” in the town of Dorsten, 
which is published without translation. The 
poster announced the establishment o f a 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council in the town 
on 10 November, 1918, to “ maintain the 
public peace, security and order to the fullest 
extent” . Citizens are urged to “ carry on with 
their business as usual” , severe punishment 
is threatened for instances of unrest and 
looting, children and youths under 17 years 
o f age are informed to be off the streets by 7 
pm, and no assembly shall obstruct or 
disturb traffic. ”
In the southern Ruhr district, in the 
Solingen-Remscheid-Dusseldorf area o f the 
metal trades, modern industrialisation also 
commenced relatively early in the 19th 
century. Metalworkers acquired a higher 
social status and incomes than the miners of 
the eastern Ruhr, altough this did not 
prevent the emergence of a radical labour 
movement. During the war this area 
developed as a stronghold o f the USP. 
However, the ‘vigorous course’ of the 
Revolution ended in December 1918 with the 
occupation o f a large part of the district by 
the British Army, which supported the 
Majority SPD, and with the speedy recovery 
of the confidence o f the substantial middle 
class.
It was in the third district, the district of 
the western Ruhr, centred on Hambom that 
the Revolution reached its apogee as a mass 
movement o f the working class. This district 
was characterised by particularly rapid 
growth from the later 19th century. In 1870 
Hambom was a village. By 1890 it had becme 
a town of some 28,000 inhabitants. By 1914, 
however, it had emerged as a city of over 
120,000. A  large proportion of the population 
consisted of migrants from the agrarian east,
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including a number o f Poles. Consequently, 
the growth of the influence of the SPD, which 
had never made significant inroads in rural 
Germany, was delayed and limited up to 
1914. In fact, Hamborn was one of the first 
cities in which syndicalism gained a 
following. Here, the Revolution was most 
spontaneous and protracted and the KPD 
made the most ground.
Within the division of the Ruhr into 
districts Tampke singles out Essen for 
special attention as the location o f an 
attempt to establish workers' control of the 
coal industry, ‘the only time between 
November 1918 and the spring o f 1919 that 
major steps were taken to push to revolution 
beyond the stage o f mere constitutional 
change’. In turn this has become the basis of 
the ‘third way’ interpretation, that the 
Revolution offered the prospect of a middle 
course between “ Bolshevism” and the 
coalition of the SPI) with the Reaction. The 
Essen model failed through the ‘vagueness 
and confusion1 of its protagonists, through 
the fact that to the Majority SPD it was 
merely window dressing, and through the 
failure o f the USP and the KPD to conquer 
power in Berlin.
Overall, Tampke presents an absorbing 
narrative oftheeventsofl918-19in the Ruhr, 
which is marred only by the absence of a map 
to enable readers to orient themselves in 
the narrative’s mobile account and by the 
failure to translate a number of German 
expressions and names of institutions. The 
progress of the Revolution is convincingly 
presented in the context of the social and 
econom ic development o f the region, 
although at times the relating of events in 
1918-19 to such developments is rather 
simplistic. The work also presents a much- 
needed antidote to the numerous accounts 
that play down the revolutionary nature of 
the situation and of events in Germany at 
that time and attribute revolutionary actions 
solely to leftwing “ agitators” . The essential 
weakness, however, rests in the analysis of 
the reasons for the failure of the Revolution.
The crucial absence of ‘a united and 
competent’ revolutionary leadership is noted 
by Tampke, although he considers that this 
would only have ‘seriuously troubled the 
social-democrat conservative alliance’. 
Moreover, even if ‘a properly led and widely 
supported Comm unist Party’ had existed it is 
considered that the Allies would have
intervened m assively to prevent the 
appearance of a socialist Germany. In 
addition, Tampke offers as a reason for the 
failure ‘the fact that recent works on 
revolutions question the feasibility of a 
rev o lu tion  o ccu rr in g  in advan ced  
industrialised countries’ . The sources of 
support for this ideological position 
translated into an universal truth are 
Hannah Arendt and Krishnar Kumar. The 
possibilities o f a ‘third way’ are dismissed on 
the basis o f the conception of workers’ 
control and the institutions of workers’ 
council having little real understanding and 
following amongst the working class.
What does emerge from this study is the 
equivocal role played the Majority SPD, 
which utilised its position at the head of the 
Revolution essentially to destroy it. The 
alliance of the Majority SPD leadership with 
the remnants of the old army leadership and 
the reactionary Free Corps (Freikorps), 
instead of allowing the formation of a Red 
Army, ensured the distruction of the 
Revolution and the survival of a Reaction 
that gathered confidence and strength 
during the Weimar Republic. This decision 
reflected the remarkable ability o f the SPD 
lead ersh ip  before  1914 to com bin e 
revolutionary rhetoric with reformist 
practice. The excesses committed by this 
alliance against the left — the suppression of 
strikes and uprisings and the murders 
committed by the Free Corps — more than 
justify the hostile attitude of the KPD 
towards the SPD in the Weimar era. 
Nevertheless, this has not prevented a 
number of historians from attributing the 
Nazi assumption of power in 1933 to the 
hostility of the KPD towards the SPD.
